Four Years of U.S. Failure in the Middle East | Opinion

Foreign policies are essentially hypotheses about how best to secure American interests abroad. Like any hypothesis, foreign policies can be objectively tested by examining their results. So, have the current administration’s theories about how to approach the Middle East proven valid? No, they have not. By any standard they have been a stunning fiasco. Across the Middle East, Biden-Harris policies have failed to keep the peace, secure American economic interests or even maintain influence with our allies.
The American occupation of Afghanistan began in 2001 with remarkable success. The rapid defeat of the Taliban and creation of a post-Taliban government were exceptional military and diplomatic achievements. They eliminated a source of terrorism and gave the United States a valuable strategic foothold in Central Asia. Our ill-conceived subsequent efforts to turn a tribal, feudal society into Switzerland failed completely. After spending 20 years, $2 trillion, 2,354 American lives (an additional 20,000 were wounded), and many thousands of Afghan lives, we managed only to replace the Taliban with more Taliban.
Our withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 was an unforced error. At the peak of our involvement in 2010 there were over 100,000 American troops in the country. More than 400 of them were killed that year. In 2020, only 8,000 American troops remained and only 11 died in combat. That year more American servicemen died in training excises than in Afghanistan. We did not need to leave in a rush.
It is difficult to overstate the costs of our disastrous withdrawal. It was the most stunning American humiliation since the fall of Saigon. It mocked the dedication of the thousands of Americans who served in Afghanistan and encouraged our enemies to doubt our resolve. It handed the Taliban $80 billion worth of American military equipment which is more hardware than we have given Ukraine. The Taliban are now busy selling it to anyone with cash. We lost control of the strategic Bagram airbase on China’s southeastern flank and left nearly 900 American citizens to the Taliban’s mercy. The plight of Afghan girls and women has become dire as has that of anyone who cooperated with us in the past.
We left without fully consulting the many NATO and other allies that had sent troops to support our effort after 9/11. Having worked with us for two decades, many of these governments are quietly resentful of our unilateral decision to leave and much less likely to join another out-of-theatre American expedition. Yet the most dangerous result of our precipitous departure remains the reemergence of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, and ISIS-K in Afghanistan.
The Islamic Republic of Iran presents the greatest threat to American interests in the Middle East. Nevertheless, over the past four years, U.S. policy has strengthened and emboldened Tehran. Rather than maintain tough, economically crippling sanctions on Iran, the United States has released billions of dollar’s worth of previously frozen Iranian funds in a deal for prisoners and allowed Iran to double its oil exports. This policy did not change Tehran’s long-term objective of pushing the United States out of the Middle East. Nor did it curtail Tehran’s nuclear weapons program or reduce its destabilizing activities across the region. Instead, this bonanza allowed Iran to accelerate its nuclear weapons program while still funding Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi terrorists.
With very substantial financial and technical support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthis have attacked international shipping in the Red Sea. They have cut shipping traffic through the Suez Canal by two-thirds and fueled inflation by dramatically increasing global shipping costs. Having taken the Houthis off our terrorist list, the current administration has belatedly put them back on it. Having blocked Saudi efforts to defeat the Houthis, the United States is now sending its own forces to confront them, thus far with very little success.
This failure to protect shipping in the Red Sea threatens Egypt and indirectly Europe. Reduced traffic in the Suez Canal has weakened the Egyptian economy at precisely the moment when fighting in Gaza threatens to drive tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees into Egypt. Political unrest in Egypt has grown increasingly likely. Any destabilization of Egypt would send waves of refugees across the Mediterranean to Europe and make the previous migrations from Libya, Syria and Africa look like minor events.
Focusing exclusively on the assassination of a journalist, Washington ignored both America’s long standing strategic interests in Saudi Arabia and the many positive reforms now taking place in that country. President Joe Biden labeled Saudi Arabia a pariah state and was then surprised when the Saudis ignored his requests to produce more oil or join our belated efforts to confront the Houthis. As Washington distanced itself from the Riyadh, the Saudis very predictably increased their ties with both China and Russia. For example, they have joined the BRICS, declined to send military assistance to Ukraine and sought Chinese assistance in restoring diplomatic ties with Iran.
By humiliating itself in Afghanistan, empowering Iran, failing to protect the Suez Canal and alienating long-time allies like Saudi Arabia, the United States undermined the structure of strategic deterrence in the Middle East. Then, Washington compounded these errors by failing to respond effectively to the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks on Israel.
Seeking to appease competing wings of the Democratic Party, the administration would neither impose a ceasefire on Israel nor allow Israel to completely defeat Hamas. Israel does not dictate American Middle East policy. That trope does not excuse Washington’s failure to end the security and humanitarian crisis in Gaza one way or another before it destabilizes other parts of the Middle East.
Four years ago, the Middle East was at peace. The Taliban did not control Kabul. Iran was hard-pressed financially. The Suez Canal was open. Our relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia were good. In 2020 the average price of oil was $40 a barrel. This year it is $82. To claim that these failures were inevitable is merely an effort to dodge responsibility.
No, these failures were not inevitable. They were the result of two very flawed hypotheses. The first was that the Middle East did not merit high-level attention because America’s position there was so secure. The second was that improving relations with Iran was more important than maintaining relations with longstanding partners like Saudi Arabia and Israel. As a result of this third-rate thinking, the Middle East is now in turmoil and America is less secure. Across the region the United States is now viewed as neither a rational, reliable friend nor a strong, determined enemy. The next president will inherit a Middle East in shambles. It will take clear thinking, focus, and years of effort to rebuild America’s position there.
David H. Rundell is a former chief of mission at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the author of Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads. Ambassador Michael Gfoeller is a former political advisor to the U.S. Central Command and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
The views expressed in this article are the writers’ own.